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The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a 
failure to report for weekend 
detention at the Allegany County 
Detention Center did not rise to the 
crime of "escape" as defined in 
section 139 of article 27 of the 
Maryland Annotated Code. Farris 
v. State, 351 Md. 24, 716 A.2d 237 
(1998). In so doing, the court 
concluded that because the 
defendant's freedom was not 
subject to any restrictions, he was 
not custody at the time of his 
failure to appear. The court 
reasoned that it would not be 
within its purview to expand the 
statute when its meaning was clear 
and unambiguous. 
Floyd Dale Farris ("Farris") 
was convicted on November 2, 
1995, in the District Court of 
Maryland for Allegany County of 
possession of a controlled 
dangerous substance. As a result 
of the conviction, Farris was 
sentenced to ninety days 
incarceration, with all the time 
suspended, and two years of 
supervised probation. In a 
subsequent court appearance, 
Farris was found guilty of 
violating his probation agreement. 
The district court again sentenced 
Farris to ninety days incarceration, 
with all but thirty days suspended, 
and placed him on three years 
supervised probation. As a 
condition of his sentence, Farris 
agreed to participate in the 
Allegany County Sheriff s 
Department weekend service of 
sentence program. Farris agreed 
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that his thirty-day sentence would 
be served over fifteen consecutive 
weekends commencing at 11 a.m. 
on Friday morning and ending at 
11 a.m. on Sunday morning. 
During the week, Farris was not 
subject to the restrictions of the 
weekend service program and was 
accordingly not credited with any 
time served. The district court 
instructed Farris that failure to 
comply with the conditions of his 
weekend detention would result in 
his incarceration for the entire 
ninety-day sentence. 
Farris began serving his 
weekend detention on May 3, 
1996. On June 21, 1996, Farris 
failed to appear for his weekend 
detention and, as a matter of 
course, was charged with escape. 
Following a trial in the Circuit 
Court of Maryland for Allegany 
County, Farris was convicted of 
escaping lawful detention and 
confinement, and was sentenced to 
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a consecutive six-month sentence 
of incarceration. 
Farris appealed to the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland 
where his conviction for escape 
was affirmed. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari in order to resolve the 
issue of whether the failure of a 
person to report for weekend 
detention in Allegany County 
constituted an "escape" as defined 
by Maryland law. 
In its review of the case, the 
court of appeals focused on 
whether Farris was within the 
constructive custody of the 
detention center during the week. 
Farris, 351 Md. at 26, 716 A.2d at 
239. The court did not address 
whether he escaped because the 
resolution of the custody question 
dictated the answer to the escape 
question. Id. at 28, 716 A.2d at 
240. 
In the first part of its opinion, 
the court reviewed and reiterated 
the method by which it interpreted 
statutes. Id. at 28-29, 716 A.2d at 
240. The court reaffirmed the line 
of cases outlining rules of statutory 
construction: if the statute is clear 
on its face, then no other 
interpretation will be used to 
supplant the legislative intent 
behind the statute, Id. at 28, 716 
A.2d at 240 (citing Briggs v. State, 
348 Md. 470, 477, 704 A.2d 904, 
908 (1998)); if the statute is 
ambiguous, the court would then 
turn to "the usual meaning of the 
words" within its context and the 
legislative intent behind the 
29.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 43 
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statute, Id. at 28-29, 716 A.2d at 
240 (citing Briggs, 348 Md. at 
477, 704 A.2d at 908); and if the 
statute is a criminal statute, then it 
is to "be construed in favor of the 
defendant to prevent courts from 
extending punishment to cases not 
plainly within the language of the 
statute." Id. at 29, 716 A.2d 240 
(citing Tapscott v. State, 343 Md. 
650, 654, 684 A.2d 439, 441 
(1996)). 
With those guiding principles 
in mind, the court examined the 
applicable portion of section 
139(a) of article 27 defining the 
elements of escape. ld. The first 
element of "escape" required the 
prisoner to have been in lawful 
custody. ld. The statute provides, 
in pertinent part, that a prisoner 
must have been detained in "the 
state penitentiary or a jail, house of 
correction, reformatory, station 
house, or other place of 
confinement in this state or . . . to 
the Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
Administration for examination or 
impatient treatment." ld. The 
court noted that the custody could 
be either "actual" (escaping from a 
prison cell) or "constructive" (not 
returning from a weekend 
furlough). Id. (citing 4 Charles E. 
Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 
633 (1996)). However, the court 
did not have to differentiate 
between the two, because both 
forms satisfied the definition of 
custody under section 139(a). Id. 
at 30, 716 A.2d at 241. To have 
lawful custody, either "actual" or 
"constructive," the court 
determined that the person must 
have some limitation imposed on 
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 44 
his personal freedom by legal 
authority. Id. at 33, 716 A.2d at 
242. The court stated that "[w]hen 
a person is free in every sense of 
the term, he or she is no longer in 
custody, and hence, cannot be 
guilty of the crime of escape." Id. 
The second element of 
"escape" is that the prisoner must 
actually depart from lawful 
detention or custody. Id. at 30, 
716 A.2d 240-41 (citing Fabian v. 
State,3 Md. App. 270, 281, 239 
A.2d. 100, 108 (1968)). Because 
the statute did not define the term 
"escape," the court relied upon the 
plain language definition as well as 
the line of Maryland cases defining 
"escape." Id. at 29, 716 A.2d 240. 
The court, however, did not have 
to provide extensive judicial gloss 
on the definition of "escape" 
because the court concluded that 
Farris was not in custody, "actual" 
or "constructive," at the time of his 
failure to appear. /d. at 35, 716 
A.2d at 243. 
The court of appeals rejected 
the State's contention that it had 
constructive custody over Farris 
during the week. ld. at 34, 716 
A.2d at 242. The court aptly noted 
that Farris was free during the 
week and that he was "neither 
lawfully committed to the 
detention center nor subject to any 
[of its] restrictions." Id. In a 
footnote, the court stated that if it 
had accepted the State's argument 
that they had constructive custody 
over Farris during the week, 
Farris' thirty-one day sentence 
would have actually been one 
hundred and three days. ld. at 35, 
716 A.2d at 243 & n.5. 
The court went on to state that 
Allegany County was one of the 
only counties that had not 
criminalized failure to appear for 
weekend detention, and that the 
Maryland legislature knew of this 
anomaly. ld. at 35, 716 A.2d at 
243. The legislature had 
criminalized failure to appear in 
other counties and "certainly knew 
how to do it" for Allegany County. 
ld. (citing statutes for ten 
Maryland Counties that 
criminalized either the failure to 
comply with authorization of 
leave, the failure to return to 
custody, or the violation of a term 
of leave). The court concluded 
that Farris was not in custody at 
the time of his violation and that 
he did not depart from the place of 
his detention. ld. His failure to 
appear for weekend detention at 
the Allegany County Detention 
Center did not constitute the crime 
of escape in Allegany County as 
provided for in section 139 of 
article 27 of the Maryland 
Annotated Code. ld. 
Finding that the failure to 
appear for weekend detention did 
not constitute the crime of 
"escape" in Allegany County, the 
court of appeals wanted to make 
the legislature aware that it needed 
to re-examine the criminality of 
this failure to appear as applied to 
Maryland counties. It is the job of 
the legislature, not the courts, to 
bring into conformity the laws of 
the counties. A better-unified 
statute criminalizing the failure to 
appear for weekend detention 
would end the disparity between 
the counties and be a source of 
consistency upon which Maryland 
practitioners can depend. 
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